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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ANN B. HOPKINS,
Appel lee,
v.

PRICE WATERHOUSE,
Appel lant.
___ ___ ___ ___
___ __

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 90-709 9

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY
INTRODUCTION

Pursu ant to Rule 8 of the Feder al Rules of Appel late
Proced ure and Rule 7 of the Rules of this Court , appel lant
Price Water house respe ctfull y reque sts that this Court stay
execu tion or enforc ement of that portio n of the Distr ict
Court 's May 25, 1990 judgm ent in this case orderi ng Price
Water house to make plain tiff a partne r in the Price Waterh ouse
firm, effec tive July 1, 1990, and award ing plain tiff •back
compe nsatio n• in_the amoun t of $371,1 75.

The stay~ is necess ary

in order to preser ve appel lant's right to an appea l and to
preve nt irrepa rable impair ment of the effec t of a succe ssful
appea l, to preve nt irrepa rable injury to appel lant's right to
determ ine who shall be admit ted to its profe ssiona l partne rship
and who may partic ipate in decisi ons affect ing the standa rds
and vitali ty of its partne rship, and to ensure the
recov erabil ity of the back pay~~w ard.

The Dis tric t Cou rt's Find ings of Fac t and
Con clus ions
of Law on Remand and Ord er gran ting app elle
e Hop kins the righ t
to be made a Pric e Wat erho use part ner and
orde ring paym ent of
back pay were issu ed May 14, 1990 and are
file d here with as
App endi x A. The Cou rt's Fina l Judg men t and
Ord er was issu ed
May 25, 1990 and is file d here with as App
endi x B. Pric e
Wat erho use app lied to the Dis tric t Cou rt
for a stay of the
judg men t on June 21, 1990 . On June 25, 1990
, the Dis tric t
Cou rt issu ed an orde r deny ing the stay "exc
ept as to atto rney
fees ," con ditio ned upon the pos ting of a
bond .
infr a. The Dis tric t Cou rt gave the foll owi
ng

App endi x c,
reas ons in

supp ort of its refu sal to stay the rem aini
ng port ion of the
judg men t:
This appe al has slig ht chan ce of succ
All majo r lega l issu es in this mat ter ess.
alre ady been reso lved in prio r app eals have
in
this case . No proo f was pres ente d on the
mer its follo win g rema nd. Only disc reti ona
ry
equ itab le reli ef con sist ent with esta blis hed
Titl e VII prec eden t has been orde red. Any
stay of the equ itab le reli ef, rega rdle ss of
the outc ome on app eal, wil l requ ire furt her
hear ings on reli ef and furt her unc erta inty
.
App . C, infr a.
The need for an eme rgen cy stay of the rem
aini ng
port ion of the judg men t is man ifes t beca use
the Dis tric t
cou rt's part ners hip adm issio n orde r is effe
ctiv e July 1, 1990 .
This requ est for exp edit ed con side rati on was
not file d seve n
days befo re the date upon whic h acti on by
the Cou rt is
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necess ary becaus e the Distri ct Court' s decisio n denyin g Price
Waterh ouse's stay applic ation was issued on June 25, 1990, only
six days prior to the effect ive date of the Distri ct Court' s
order.

Counse l for plaint iff was notifie d by telepho ne on June

25, 1990 of Price Waterh ouse's intent to seek expedi ted
consid eration of this motion .
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42

u.s.c

§ 2000e, gt_~-

Appell ee Hopkin s has

contend ed that appell ant's 1983 decisio n deferri ng for one year
her candid acy for admiss ion to the Price Waterh ouse partne rship
was unlawf ully based upon consid eration s of sex.

She has

sought an order requiri ng her admiss ion to the partne rship,
back pay and attorn ey's fees.
In its initia l decisio n in 1985, Hopkin s v. Price
Waterh ouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (D.D.C . 1985), the Distric t
Court found that althoug h appell ee's •condu ct provide d ample
justifi cation for the compla ints that formed the basis [for
appell ant's] decisio n• and that there were legitim ate,
non-pr etextua l bases for deferri ng her partne rship candid acy,
appella nt had noneth eless permit ted •uncon scious• sexual
stereot yping to play an •undef ined role• in the decisio nrnakin g
proces s.

The Distri ct Court conclud ed that becaus e appella nt

had not proven by •clear and convin cing eviden ce that the
decisio n [to defer appell ee's candid acy for one year] would
,'
i
I

-
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have been the same absent discrimin ation,• id. at 1120,
appellant had violated Title VII.i/
In August 1987, this Court affirmed the District
Court's decision as to liability •[b]ecaus e Price Waterhous e
could not demonstra te by clear and convincin g evidence" that it
would have made the same decision in 1983 deferring for one
year appellee' s partnersh ip candidacy irrespecti ve of her
gender.

Hopkins v. Price Waterhous e, 825 F.2d 458, 472 (D.c.

Cir. 1987).Z/
On May 1, 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the decision of this Court.
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).

Price Waterhous e v.

The Court held that "an

employer shall not be liable if it can prove [by a
preponder ance of the evidence] that, even if it had not taken
gender into account, it would have come to the same decision
regarding a particula r person."

.I.d. at 1786.

The Supreme

Court reversed the judgment of liability against Price
Waterhous e and remanded the case for further proceeding s
because this Court and the District Court had •erred by

1/ When appellee came up for partnersh ip considera tion the
following year, she was not reproposed . The District Court
ruled that appellant 's decision the subsequen t year not to
repropose appellee for partner was nondiscrim inatory . .I.d. at
1115. That finding was not appealed.
Z/

Judge Williams dissented from the panel's holding affirming
liability, observing that •the record here provided no causal
connection between Hopkins' fate and [sexual]
stereotypi ng . . • . • 825 F.2d at 474 (Williams, J.,
dissentin g).
;

-
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decidi ng that the defen dant must make this proof by clear and
convin cing eviden ce . . . . • M. at 1795. In an Augus t 1,
1989 order , this Court vacate d its 1989 manda te and remand ed to
the Distr ict Court for furthe r proce eding s.

~- ---briefi
---ng-- •7

Upon remand and after

and argum ent, the Distr ict Court ruled that Price Water house
"ha[d] not met its burden • under the prepon deranc e of the
eviden ce standa rd and theref ore was liable under Title VII.
App. A, infra, at 11. In determ ining the appro priate remedy ,
the court below conclu ded that it had statut ory autho rity under
Title VII to order Price Water house to admit appel lee to the
profe ssiona l partne rship and that such an order was an
appro priate exerc ise of its discre tion in this case. l.d. at
16, 19. The Distr ict Court also ruled that, althou gh appel lee
had failed to mitig ate damag es, she was entitl ed to back pay
for the period July 1, 1984 throug h June 30, 1990.
The Distr ict Court entere d its final order and
judgm ent on May 25, 1990 requir ing Price Water house, inter
alia, to admit appel lee into the partne rship on July 1, 1990
and to pay appell ee back pay in the amoun t of $371,1 75 and
reason able attorn ey's fees. App. B, infra. On June 21, 1990,
Price Waterh ouse timely filed its Notice of Appea l and Motion
for Stay in the Distr ict Court . The Distr ict Court denied
Price Water house 's motio n for stay on June 25, 1990, •excep t as
to attorn ey fees.• App. c, infra.

-
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ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION
TO STAY THE PARTNERSHIP ADMISSION ORDER
As the Dist rict Cour t found afte r the firs t tria l,
"Pric e Wate rhous e is a partn ersh ip that spec ializ es
in
prov iding audi ting, tax and mana geme nt cons ultin g
serv ice
prim arily to priv ate corp orati ons and gove rnme nts
.
partn ers are cert ified publ ic acco unta nts and othe
r
spec ialis ts."

618 F. Supp . at 1111 .

Its

Notw ithst andin g its size ,

"Pric e Wate rhous e has cons isten tly soug ht to main tain
the
trad ition al char acte risti cs of a prof essio nal partn
ersh ip both
in its mana geme nt and partn ersh ip selec tion prac tices
." .Id.
In its deci sion in 1983 to "hold " or defe r appe llee'
s
partn ersh ip cand idacy , appe llant was respo nding to
probl ems
that appe llee had mani feste d in deali ng with subo rdina
tes. She
was "ove rly aggr essiv e, undu ly harsh , diff icul t to
work with
and impa tient with staf f.• .Id. at 1113 . The Dist
rict Cour t
found that these char acte risti cs were •pro perly an
impo rtant
part of Price Wate rhou se's writ ten partn ersh ip eval
uatio n
crite ria" and that her "ina bilit y to get along with
staff or
peer s is a legit imat e, nond iscri mina tory reaso n for
refus ing to
admi t a cand idate to partn ersh ip.• .Id. at 1114 . Appe
llee
recei ved more •no" vote s on her cand idacy than 85 of
the 88
cand idate s in 1983 . And, the Dist rict Cour t twice
found that
appe llant 's deci sion no t to repro pose plai ntiff for
partn er the

-
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following year was nondiscrim inatory .

.Id. at 1115.

In fact,

the District Court found that appellee' s "unreason able
intention al conduct" (App. A, infra, at 23) "removed any
possibili ty that she would be accepted as a partner" after the
initial "hold" decision.

Id. at 25.

Nonethele ss, the District Court found that certain of
the comments about appellee in the initial partnersh ip
decisionm aking process relative to the "hold" decision may have
been "tainted by unarticul ated, unconscio us assumption s related
to sex."

618 F. Supp. at 1118.

Thus, although "it is

impossible to label any particula r negative reaction as being
motivated by intention al sex stereotyp ing," (.id.) the District
Court held that those impermiss ible ingredien ts "combined to
produce discrimin ation" in this case.

,lg_.

at 1120.

On remand,

the District Court found unpersuas ive appellant 's arguments
that the nature, depth, diversity and intensity of the
criticism leveled at appellee by partners, and her peers and
acknowledg ed by herself, and the evidence that was accepted by
the District Court that males with similar personali ty problems
had also been "held," did not establish by a prepondera nce of
the evidence that Price Waterhous e would have deferred the
partnersh ip of appellee or any candidate with a similar record,
regardless of sex.
The District Court ordered Price Waterhous e to make
appellee a partner in the firm on July 1, 1990.

During the

trial, the Court acknowled ged that ordering a partnershi p in a
II

profession al firm was an unprecede nted Title VII remedy:

-
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I now am confr onted with wheth er or not I'm
going to exerc ise my discr etion as a judge
to be the first feder al jud ge~ to put
someb ody into a partn ershi p and I want to
tell you that that' s a diffi cult decis ion.
1990 Tr. at 250 (emph asis added ).
Indee d, no feder al court has ever decre ed a profe ssion al
partn ershi p as a Title VII remed y.
Appe llant conte nds that it is entit led to appea l the
Distr ict Cour t's decis ion that a partn ershi p is a prope r
Title
VII remed y, espe ciall y in a case where the candi date was
overw helmi ngly rejec ted by the partn ershi p for legiti mate
nond iscrim inato ry reaso ns, and where her own •unre asona ble
inten tiona l• condu ct made it impo ssible for her to becom e

a

partn er.

Howe ver, unles s this Court stays the decis ion of the
Distr ict Cour t, appe llant will be force d to make appel lee
a
partn er on July 1, damag ing imme asura bly the oppo rtuni ty
to
appea l and to recei ve the effec t of a succe ssful appea l of

this

uniqu e, impo rtant, diffi cult and unpre ceden ted decis ion.
Denia l of a stay subs tanti ally nulli fies appe llant 's right

to

appea l.
This Court shoul d exerc ise its discr etion to stay the
equit able order of the Distr ict Court requi ring Price
Water house to admit plain tiff to the partn ershi p durin g the

-
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penden cy of the appeal .

s.e..e_ Fed. R. App. Proc. 8. ~/

The

factor s relevan t in determ ining the approp riatene ss of a stay
includ e: "{l) Has the petitio ner made a strong showin g that it
is likely to prevai l on the merits of its appeal? . . .
{2) Has the petitio ner shown that withou t such relief , it will
be irrepar ably injured ? . . . {3) Would the issuanc e of a stay
substa ntially harm other partie s interes ted in the
procee dings? . . .

{4) Where lies the public interes t?"

Washin gton Metrop olitan Area Transi t Comm. v. Holida y Tours.
~ , 559 F.2d 841, 843 {D.C. Cir. 1977) {quotin g Virgin ia
Petrole um Jobber s Ass'n v. Federa l Power Commi ssion, 259 F.2d
921 {D.C. Cir. 1958)) . These factors require a stay of the
partne rship admiss ion order in this case.

~/ The posting of a superse deas bond also may entitle Price
Waterh ouse to a stay of the partne rship admiss ion order under
Rule 62{d) of the Federa l Rules of Civil Proced ure. ~ Becker
v. United States . 451 U.S. 1306, 1309 {1981) (Rehnq uist,
Circui t Justice ) (taxpay er appeal ing order compel ling it to
turn over materi als in respon se to tax summons entitle d to
automa tic stay upon posting of a bond). ~ Schuln er v. J.......
Eckerd Corp., 572 F. Supp. 56 {S.D. Fla. 1983) {stay of
reinsta tement order in age discrim ination case granted upon
posting of bond).
I
1

-
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a.

Pro bab ility of Suc cess on the Mer its

The Dis tric t Cou rt's dec isio n rais es sub
stan tial and
imp orta nt que stio ns reg ard ing the juri
sdi ctio nal reac h and
app lica tion of Tit le VII . Not with stan
ding the Dis tric t Cou rt's
late st cha rac teri zat ion of the par tne rsh
ip adm issi on ord er as
"co nsis ten t wit h esta blis hed Tit le VII
pre ced ent, " App . C,
infr a. on den ial of app ella nt's stay app
lica tion , whe ther
fed eral cou rts hav e aut hor ity und er Tit
le VII to com pel
ind ivid uals to beco me par tne rs is an issu
e of firs t
imp ress ion .~/ Ind eed , the Dis tric t Cou
rt's opin ion
ackn owl edge d tha t the que stio n "wh ethe
r the Cou rt sho

uld forc e

Pric e Wat erho use to mak e Ms. Hop kins a
par tne r pre sen ts a
dif ficu lt and unr eso lved issu e." App .
A, infr a, at 16.
The Dis tric t Cou rt pur por ted to rely upo
n the Sup rem e
Cou rt's dec isio n in Hish on v. King & Spa
ldin g. 467 U.S . 69
(198 4), for aut hor ity to ord er par tner
ship in this cas e.
How ever , the Cou rt's "nar row hold ing"
(id. at 78 n.10 ) in
Hish on tha t "in app rop riat e circ ums tanc
es par tne rsh ip
con side rati on may qua lify as a term , con
diti on, or priv ileg e of

4/ The Dis tric t Cou rt did not reac h the
issu e whe ther
par tne rsh ip adm issi on was an auth oriz
ed
or
app rop riat e rem edy
in this case in the firs t tria l; rath er,
it
held tha t such
reli ef was not ava ilab le as a mat ter of
law
bec
ause pla inti ff
vol unt aril y resi gne d from the firm in
Jan
uary
1984
and had
fail ed to prov e tha t she was "co nstr uct
ive
ly
disc
har
ged ." 618
F. Sup p. at 112 1. Thu s, nei the r this Cou
rt
nor
the
Sup rem e
Cou rt con side red the mer its of the issu
es
to
be
pres
ente
d by
Pric e Water hou se rega rdin g the val idit y
of
the
Dis
tric
t
Cou rt's
par tner ship adm issi on ord er.
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a perso n's emplo yment " (emph asis added ) for purpo ses of
Title VII does not resol ve the quest ion of the power of
court s
under Title VII to decid e who shall be partn ers in a
profe ssion al relat ionsh ip or to regul ate the relat ionsh ip
among
profe ssion al partn ers. In a concu rring opini on in Hisho
n,
Justi ce Powe ll obser ved that undue "impe dimen ts to the exerc
ise
of one's right to choos e one's assoc iates can viola te the
right
of assoc iatio n guara nteed by the First and Fourt eenth
Amen dment s," id. at 80 n.4, and emph asized "that the Cour
t's
opini on shoul d not be read as exten ding Title VII to the
manag ement of a law firm by its partn ers. The reaso ning
of the
Cour t's opini on does not requi re that the relat ionsh ip among
partn ers be chara cteriz ed as an 'empl oyme nt• relat ionsh ip
to
which Title VII would apply ." .Id. at 79 (emph asis added
).~/
The Distr ict Cour t's order would not only compe l the creat
ion
of a "rela tions hip among partn ers," but would also appar ently
affor d to the Distr ict Court perma nent and conti nuing
juris dicti on over that relat ionsh ip.

S,e.e. App.

B, infra .

Title VII expre ssly appli es only to "empl oymen t"
arran geme nts and makes "rein state ment or hirin g of emplo yees"

~/ It appea rs that most court s have decli ned to exten d feder
al
antid iscrim inatio n statu tes, inclu ding Title VII, to memb
ers
of
profe ssion al partn ershi ps • .5..e..e., e..i.Q..a., Burke v.
man, 556
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (Titl e VII inapp licab le Fried
to partn ers);
™ .il.S.2. Whee ler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 263 (10th
Cir .),~ - denie d. 484 U.S. 986 (1987 ) ("To date, court
shown no dispo sition to exten d [the prote ction of feder al s have
anti- discr imin ation statu tes] to gener al partn ers." ).

- 11 -

an availab le remedy .

42

u.s.c. S

2000e- 5(g) (empha sis added) .

There is nothing to sugges t that Title VII

was

intende d to

empowe r courts to transfo rm simple employ ment relatio nships
into partne rships, or to order individ uals to become partne rs
once their employ ment relatio nship has been termin ated.

~

Wheele r v. Main Hurdma n, 825 F.2d 257, 275-76 (10th Cir.),
~ - denied , 484 U.S. 986 (1987) .

("The require ment that

[Title VII and simila r federa l statute s] cover only employ ment
situati ons sugges ts that Congre ss perceiv ed a need to limit the
applic ation of these statut es."). The Distri ct Court' s
decisio n wholly fails to "giv[e] effect to the meaning and
placem ent of the words chosen by Congre ss," Hughey v. United
states , No. 89-569 1, slip op., at 6 (U.S. May 21, 1990), and
presen ts serious questio ns of statuto ry interp retatio n.
Price Waterh ouse also conten ds that the Distri ct Court
commit ted revers ible error when it ordere d Price Waterh ouse to
admit appelle e as a partne r under the peculi ar facts of this
case.

The court compel led partne rship admiss ion based upon the
"ill-de fined theory of 'sex stereo typing ,'" App. A, infra. at

32, even though it found that plaint iff "was given a genuine
chance " to overcom e her interpe rsonal skills problem s after the
1983 hold decisio n and that plaint iff's own "unreas onable
intenti onal conduc t,• .iJ;l. at 23 (empha sis added) , preclud ed her
from "any possib ility" of attaini ng partne rship. I.d. at 25.
The Distri ct Court furthe r ordered partne rship based on the
assump tion that it was bound by the "law of the case• to the
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prev ious cons truc tive disc harg e deci sion of this
Cou rt
notw ithst andi ng that that rulin g was not only
subs eque ntly
vaca ted, but was base d upon an erro neou s read
ing of the
Dis tric t Cou rt's earl ier find ings of fact . Orde
ring a
part ners hip unde r such circu msta nce cann ot reas
onab ly be
char acte rize d as an appr opri ate exer cise of equi
tabl e
disc retio n unde r Titl e VII, even if the stat ute
auth oriz es such
reli ef. It woul d be part icul arly ineq uita ble
not to stay the
effe ct of such a deci sion pend ing an appe al.
Base d upon the fore goin g, Pric e Wate rhou se subm
its
that the prob abil ity of succ ess on the mer its
of appe al from
the Dis tric t Cou rt's judg ment is suff icie nt to
just ify a stay .
~

Was hing ton Met ropo litan Area Tran sit. 559 F.2d
at 844- 45
(pro bab ility of succ ess test met and stay of inju
ncti on
affir med wher e "ser ious " and "dif ficu lt" ques tion
s were

pres ente d).

As this Cour t reco gniz ed in Was hing ton

Met ropo litan Area Tran sit. the "pro babi lity of
succ ess on the
mer its inqu iry" does not requ ire the Cour t •to
draw the fine
line betw een a math ema tical prob abil ity and a
subs tant ial
pos sibi lity of succ ess, • or to enga ge in an •exa
gger ated ly
refin ed anal ysis of the mer its.• 559 F.2d at
844.
This case
indi sput ably pres ents a ••fa ir grou nd for litig
atio n and thus
for more deli bera tive inve stig atio n,•• id. (cita
tion omi tted ),
and, as disc usse d belo w, the bala nce of the equ
ities favo rs a
stay .

- 13 -

b.

Balancing the Equities
The balance of the equities strongly favors the

granting of a stay of the District Court"s partnersh ip
admission order because "little if any harm will befall
interested persons or the public.

[whereas] denial of the

order would inflict irreparab le injury on the movant."
Washingto n Metropoli tan Area Transit, 559 F.2d at 844.
1.

Irreparab le Injury

In the absence of a stay, the members of the Price
Waterhous e firm will be compelled by judicial decree to accept
as a partner an individua l they had legitimate ,
nondiscrim inatory reasons to reject, and to enter into the
"strained partnersh ip relationsh ip" (slip op. at 20) that the
firm seeks to challenge on appeal as an inappropr iate and
unauthoriz ed Title VII remedy.

The order will have unique,

immediate , direct and permanent consequen ces for the
partnersh ip.

~

Washingto n Gas Co. v. Federal Energy

Regulator y Commissio n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Decisions and conduct by appellee as a Price Waterhous e partner
will in most respects be irrevocab le.

Relations hips with Price

Waterhous e clients will be irreparabl y altered.

In short, the

partnersh ip, once establishe d, will be extremely difficult ,
and, in some respects, impossibl e, to unravel.

J

!

-
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The courts in equity histor ically have been relucta nt
to compel the existen ce and contin uation of person al
relatio nships .

~ , ~ , Karric k v. Hannam an, 168 U.S. 328,

335 (1897) (courts "will seldom , if ever, specif ically
compel . . . perform ance of [a partne rship] contra ct, the
contra ct of partne rship being of an essent ially person al
charac ter") (empha sis added) ; EEOC v. Kallir Phillip s Ross,
l.D&....., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N .Y. 1976), (distin guishi ng

high level execut ive positio ns from "assem bly line or cleric al
worker " positio ns to suppor t denial of reinsta tement when the
positio n in questio n "requir ed a close workin g relatio nship
betwee n plaint iff and top execut ives of defend ant• and
"frequ ent person al contac t with defend ant's clients "), aff'd
withou t opinio n, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 434
U.S. 920 (1977); Hyland v. Kenner Produc ts Co., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Case (BNA) 1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (reject ing
reinsta tement of execut ive becaus e, inter alia, "unlike an
unskil led worker , a person in an execut ive or manage ment
positio n must have comple te confide nce of others in
manage ment"). ~/

~/ ~ ~ C l a r k v. Truitt . 183 Ill. 239, 55 N.E. 683, 685
(1899) ("'An agreem ent to enter into a partne rship, and, as a

partne r, to use and exercis e person al skills and judgme nt in
the contro l and manage ment of the partne rhsip busine ss, is not
enforc eable specif ically .'") (citati ons omitte d); Marek v.
McHardy. 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689, 693 (1958) ("Mani festly,
in a case like this involvi ng person al service s coupled with a
promis e of the oblige es to make the plaint iff their busine ss
partne r, the court would not oi~er the except ional relief of
specif ic perform ance.•) .
·
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A Price Waterh ouse partne rship would entail hundre ds
of such person al relatio nships with partne rs and employ ees of
Price Waterh ouse and, most import antly, with Price Waterh ouse
Thus, the failure to grant a stay will irrepar ably
injure Price Waterh ouse and will deny effecti ve relief to Price
Waterh ouse if it prevai ls on appeal . Compar e Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plura lity opinion ) (the •1oss of
First Amendment freedom s• of speech and associ ation, •for even
minima l period s of time, unques tionabl y consti tutes irrepar able
injury ."); Dayton Christ ian School s v. Ohio Civil Rights
Commi ssion, 604 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (irrepa rable
injury demons trated where "the absenc e of injunc tive relief"
pending appeal would have the "pract ical conseq uences " of
depriv ing appella nt from "poten tial benefi ts of pursuin g
appell ate review ").
2.

Likelih ood of Substa ntial Harm to Appell ee

During the remedi al phase trial on remand , appelle e
charac terized her presen t positio n as a budget office r at the
World Bank as •an absolu tely superb positio n . . . with
terrifi c benefi ts.•
Append ix D.

1990 Tr., at 25, attache d hereto as

Moreov er, the Distri ct Court viewed back pay for

the period July 1, 1983 through the effecti ve date of the
partne rship admiss ion order as suffic ient to make the appelle e
•whole • for losses alleged ly caused by Price Waterh ouse, and
there is nothing to sugges t that such relief would not be
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adequate to address any losses suffered by appellee during the
pendency of this appeal.

A stay would not cause any injury to

appellee differen t in kind than she has already asserted ly
suffered .

Under such circums tances, appellee cannot claim that

she will suffer "substa ntial harm" if the Court grants a stay
of the partners hip admissio n portion of the judgmen t.
3.

The Public Interes t

Given the extraord inary and unpreced ented nature of
the relief ordered by the court below, the public interest
manifes tly favors the granting of a stay. 1 /

The Supreme

Court pluralit y opinion reversin g the initial judgmen t of
liabilit y against Price Waterho use was, in large part, premised
on "Title VII's balance between employe e rights and employe r
preroga tives."

109 S. Ct. at 1786.

The Court recogniz ed that,

in addition to eradica ting employm ent discrim ination, "[t]he
other importan t aspect of [Title VII] is its preserva tion of
the employe r's remainin g freedom of choice."

M-

The delicate

policy balance embodied by Title VII dictates that the status
IDAQ.

be maintain ed pending appella te resoluti on of the importan t

issues involved in this case regardin g the circums tances under

2/

A stay of the judgmen t in this "obviou sly atypical case•
(App. A, infra, at 33) only indirec tly implicat es the •public
interest " factor. ~ Washing ton Metropo litan Area Transit,
559 F.2d at 843 ("this is not a case where the Commiss ion has
ruled that the service performe d by appellan t is contrary to
the public interes t").
,,
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whic h cour ts may regu late the affa irs of prof essio
nal
partn ersh ips. ~ Dayt on Chri stian Scho ols, 604 F.
Supp . at
104 ("the publ ic inte rest will be best serve d by issui
ng an
injun ction and allow ing an appe al" to "assu re that
a high er
cour t will be able to weig h and to cons ider the need
and
oblig ation of the state to act to end alleg ed sex
discr imin ation with out offen ding fund amen tal Firs t
Amendment
valu es.") . If a stay is deni ed, appe llee will becom
e a partn er
of Price Wate rhous e and the impo rtant issue of whet
her that is
a perm issib le reme dy unde r the Title VII may becom
e,
prac tical ly, if not lega lly, moot . Id.
II
PRICE WATERHOUSE IS ENTITLED TO A STAY
OF THE MONETARY PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UPON THE POSTING
AND APPROVAL OF A SUPERSEDEAS BOND

Altho ugh the Dist rict Cour t gran ted Price Wate rhou
se's
requ est for a stay of the attor ney' s fees porti on of
the
judgm ent cond ition ed upon the posti ng of a supe rsede
as bond ,
the cour t, with o~t expl anat ion, denie d Price Wate r-hou
se's
requ est for a stay of the back pay award on the same
basi s.
Howe ver, it is well settl ed, and appe llee has conc eded
,~/
that the party appe aling a mone y judgm ent is enti tled
to a stay

~I ~ Plai ntiff 's Oppo sitio n to Defe ndan t's Moti on
Pend ing Appe al, at 1 ("Pl aint iff does not, of cour se, for Stay
with the prop ositi on that an adeq uate supe rsede as bond argue
will
secu re and stay the money judgm ~nt in this case .").
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as a matt er of righ t upon the post ing of a good and
suff icien t
supe rsede as bond and appr oval of the bond by the Dist
rict
Cour t. ~ Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 62{d ) {"Th e stay is
effe ctive
when the supe rsede as bond is appro ved by the cour
t."); Amer ican
Man ufact urers Mutu al Ins. Co. v. Ame rican
Broa dcas ting- Para moun t Thea ters. Inc, . 87 S. Ct. 1
{1966 )
{Har lan, Circ uit Just ice); Fede ral Pres crip tion Serv
ice. Inc.
v. Ame rican Phar mace utica l Ass' n, 636 F.2d 755 (D.C.
Cir.
1980 ); 7 Moo re's Fede ral Prac tice

,r

62.0 6.~/

This Cour t

shou ld stay exec ution or enfor ceme nt of the back pay
porti on of
the May 25, 1990 judgm ent cond ition ed upon Pric e Wate
rhou se's
posti ng of a supe rsede as bond in an amou nt suff icien
t to cove r
the back pay awar d, plus post- judg ment inte rest, durin
g the
pend ency of the appe al and appr oval of the bond by
the Dist rict
Cour t.

CONCLUSION
The Dist rict Cour t's judgm ent raise s sign ifica nt and
diff icul t issue s for appe al and its deni al of a stay
effe ctive ly depr ives appe llant of its righ t to appe
al.

The

~/ The Cour t has disc retio n to gran t a stay of the
this case with out the posti ng of a bond beca use therejudgm ent in
"reas onab le likel ihoo d of the judgm ent debt or's inab is no
unwi lling ness to satis fy the judgm ent in full upon ility or
disp ositi on of the case" and there fore an unse cured ultim ate
not •und uly enda nger• plai ntif f's "inte rest in ultimstay will
reco very .• Fede ral Pres cript ion Serv ice, 636 F.2d ate
(gran ting of unse cured stay appr opria te unde r the at 760-6 1
circu msta nces ).
~
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author ity of this Court to mainta in the

status ™-

pendin g

dispos ition of this appeal is clear, as is the approp riatene ss
of the exerci se of that author ity in this case.

The stay

should be granted .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing
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